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What is Legal Doctrine
Emerson Tiller and Frank B. Cross
Abstract
Legal doctrine is the currency of the law. In many respects, doctrine is the law, at
least as it comes from courts. Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that
comprise legal doctrine. Yet the nature and effect of legal doctrine has been woe-
fully understudied. Researchers from the legal academy and from political science
departments have conducted extensive research on the law, but they have largely
ignored the others’ efforts. Part of the reason for this unfortunate disconnect is
that neither has effectively come to grips with the descriptive meaning of legal
doctrine. In this article, we attempt to describe the concept of legal doctrine and
propound various theories of how legal doctrine may matter in judicial decision
making and how those theories may be empirically tested.
 
What Is Legal Doctrine? 
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Legal doctrine is the currency of the law.  In many respects, doctrine, or precedent, is the 
law, at least as it comes from courts.  Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that 
comprise legal doctrine.  Yet the nature and effect of legal doctrine has been woefully 
understudied.  Researchers from the legal academy and from political science 
departments have conducted extensive research on the law, but they have largely ignored 
the others’ efforts.1  Unfortunately, neither has effectively come to grips with the 
descriptive meaning of legal doctrine.  In this article, we propound various theories of 
how legal doctrine may matter and how those theories may be tested. 
 Legal doctrine sets the terms for future resolution of cases in an area.  Doctrine 
may take many forms, it may be fact dependent, and therefore limited, or sweeping in its 
breadth.  One doctrinal distinction commonly discussed in the law is the distinction 
between “rules” and “standards.”2  Rules are strict requirements that define the answer to 
a dispute, once the predicate facts are established.  A rule is something like “any 
subsequent and unauthorized use of another’s mark constitutes trademark infringement.”.  
Standards, by contrast, are more amorphous guides to resolving disputes, often listing a 
set of factors to be considered and balanced.  A standard would be a law that directed 
“trademark infringement occurs when there is a likelihood of confusion between the 
senior and junior marks, as determined by weighing the following factors …”..  Both 
doctrinal approaches are found in the law, but there is little analysis of why one might 
prefer a rule or a standard and what the subsequent effects of the two types of doctrine 
might be.3  It is frequently presumed that standards leave space for more ideological 
judging, but this claim has never been demonstrated 
 Legal researchers have extensively dealt with doctrine as a normative matter, but 
have given little attention to the manner in which it actually functions.  Social scientists, 
who have done important descriptive work about how courts actually function, have 
largely ignored the significance of legal doctrine.  Consequently, we are left with a very 
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poor understanding of the most central question about the law’s functioning in society.  
Fortunately, recent years have seen the beginnings of rigorous research into this question.  
As legal researchers increasingly conduct quantitative empirical research and collaborate 
with social scientists, we may hope for an efflorescence of this research and a greatly 
enhanced understanding of legal doctrine.  The necessary information requires the 
scientific study of legal doctrine.  This article sketches a theoretical outline of how that 
research might proceed. 
 
I. Traditional Legal Views of Doctrine 
 
The conventional legal approach to the law is all about doctrine.  Legal academics 
understand that the language of judicial opinions represents the law.  The classical form 
of legal scholarship was doctrinal analysis, in which a researcher examined the content of 
a legal opinion and evaluated whether it was effectively reasoned or explored its 
implications for future cases.4  Doctrinal analysis was grounded in a descriptive premise 
that reasoned argument from doctrinal premises actually explained judicial decisions.  
This research was often evaluative and critical but implied only that courts had erred, 
such that a persuasive doctrinal analysis could show the judiciary the error of its ways 
and provoke a new course of legal reasoning. 
 Legal academics, unsurprisingly, have focused on the traditional legal model of 
judicial decision making based on “reasoned response to reasoned argument.”5  Through 
this process, one obtains “legal reasoning that can generate outcomes in controversial 
disputes independent of the political or economic ideology of the judge.”6  Central to this 
legal model is the basing of decisions on some neutral legal principles, free from any 
political or personal contamination.  By its very nature, the identity of the judge should 
not determine the judicial outcome, if the law rules.  In this legal model of judicial 
decision making, a judge identifies the facts of the case, identifies the legal rules that best 
govern those facts, and then applies those legal rules to the facts, with simple logic 
dictating the judge’s decision. 
 The legal realists attacked this conventional wisdom in the first half of the 20th 
Century.  They claimed that the traditional materials of the law, such as doctrine, did not 
determine judicial decisions.7  For the realists, legal language was too indeterminate to 
answer judicial disputes, and judges had no self interest in relying on the law in 
decisions, as opposed to their personal preferences.  The realists maintained that judges 
first identified their desired resolution of a case, perhaps due to personal ideological 
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preferences, and then manipulated the available legal materials to support that 
conclusion.8  In this vision, legal doctrine was mere window dressing. 
 Although subsequent legal research never fully came to grips with and refuted the 
descriptive claims of the legal realists, the theory’s influence waned in the face of the 
“legal process” school.  In this perspective, “the study of law became the study of a 
procedure by which judges, rather than simply apply doctrine in a mechanical fashion, 
use doctrine in the process of reasoning towards a decision.”9  The theory was sometimes 
associated with the use of “neutral principles,” and it gave considerable attention to legal 
procedures, in addition to substantive rules. 
Fundamentally, if implicitly, the legal process school did challenge the premises 
of legal realism, in its emphasis on the importance of procedure.  There is no particular 
reason why an ideological judiciary would create such elaborate rules of procedure, and 
use them in decisions, rather than manipulating the substantive law to reach their 
preferred decisions.  Consider the procedural rule requiring appellate courts to give 
deference to the factual findings of trial courts.  This rule is orthogonal to ideology, as the 
lower court decision may be ideologically agreeable or disagreeable.  Yet the rule of 
deference not only exists, it is widely adhered to.  This legal rule is amenable to legal 
testing, as one can quantitatively code for reversals or affirmances.  When such a study 
was conducted, it found that this procedural deference was a more significant determinant 
of circuit court outcomes than was judicial ideology.10  Moreover, when doctrine 
commanded a higher or lower level of deference to the ruling below, the circuit court’s 
probability of reversal corresponded with the level of deference it was to give.11  The 
legal process theorists did not conduct such empirical analyses, of course, but their theory 
on this doctrine was falsifiable, and when confirmed on empirical testing undermined the 
more extreme claims of legal realism. 
The legal process analysis was narrowly legal, though, and didn’t consider the 
societal implications of doctrine.  For example, a judge might reach the same result on a 
substantive or procedural basis and accordingly set a substantive or procedural precedent.  
The open question is why a judge would choose one path over the other and what the 
implications of that choice are for future decisions.  A naïve legalist would assume that 
this choice was driven by the dictates of the law and only the law, but this assumption is 
unproved and in fact contradicted by considerable evidence that is discussed in the 
following section. 
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Many legal researchers now recognize that judicial ideology influences judicial 
decisions.  Some have conducted empirical research that shows this effect.12  This 
research has assumed some public policy significance as it has been cited by a member of 
Congress in a judicial confirmation debate.13  The empirical analyses of ideology, 
including those performed by social scientists (as discussed below) has increasingly 
entered legal research.  This recognition of ideology by legal researchers, though, does 
not involve a dismissal of the role of doctrine in decision making, though it unfortunately 
has caused the significance of legal doctrine to be overlooked. 
 Legal researchers have not entirely ignored the broader functioning of doctrine, 
and a few particular doctrines have even seen serious analysis.  Perhaps the best example 
would be the law of standing and the doctrines relating to it.  Richard Pierce has argued 
and presented some evidence that standing doctrines are entirely ideological, such that “a 
liberal judge would give standing to environmentalists, employees, and prisoners, but not 
to banks, while a conservative judge would give standing to banks, but not to 
environmentalists, employees or prisoners.”14  A more recent study concluded that that 
“judges render law-abiding and predictable decisions where clear precedent and effective 
judicial oversight exist; where these variables are absent, however, standing decisions are 
more likely to be based on judges' personal ideologies.”15  The most likely explanation 
for standing rules is a doctrinal attempt to influence the ideology of future lower court 
decisions.  By adding a hurdle that plaintiffs must surmount, the doctrine makes it more 
difficult to sue the government, and easier for ideological judges to reject such lawsuits.  
If one assumes that access to court generally advances legal ends, one would expect 
judicial conservatives to press for a stricter standing doctrine, as they in fact have.16
 Legal research has also begun to take the first steps toward a broader analysis of 
the role of decision structures in judicial decision making.  Pablo Spiller and Matthew 
Spitzer, for example, have theorized that a judge might use a constitutional decision 
instrument to resolve a case, rather than a statutory one, in order to insulate that decision 
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from congressional override.17  This is the type of more sophisticated doctrinal analysis 
that is needed, but it suffers from a certain naiveté about the law, as judges do not 
commonly have available such a choice between constitutional and statutory theories.  
Most statutory interpretation cases do not present constitutional issues.   
Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller theorized that lower court judges may employ 
“instrument” choices – in their study, the choice between statutory interpretation and 
reasoning process as decision modes to reverse agency policies -- to insulate their 
decisions from higher court review when the lower court wishes to protect its decisions 
from the chance of higher court reversal.18  Tiller and Joseph Smith examined circuit 
court administrative law decisions and a strategic association in connection with a judge’s 
choice of legal instruments (process or statutory) in administrative law cases.19  They 
concluded that judges can use their choice among decision instruments to insulate their 
case outcomes from reversal by an ideologically contrary higher court.  Subsequent 
research into the judicial application of sentencing guidelines reached similar findings 
about the doctrinal choices of judges.20
 Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller examined the role of doctrine on three judge 
panels of the circuit courts and found that doctrine played a key role when (1) the panel 
was made up of both democrat and republican appointees (rather than being unified in 
political ideology), and (2) the political-minority judge had the doctrine supporting his 
position.21  In such case, the panel majority followed doctrine rather than the panel 
majority’s assumed political policy preference.  By contrast, when the panel was 
politically unified, doctrine was systematically ignored if it conflicted with the desired 
policy outcome of the majority. 
 Frank Cross also has embarked on some empirical analysis of the actual effect of 
legal doctrine.  With Stefanie Lindquist, he has sought to measure if and when doctrine 
controls the decisions of the courts.22  This study initially examined cases of first 
impression, without doctrinal direction, and found that judges in such cases were in fact 
more ideological than in cases governed by precedent.  As precedent developed over 
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time, however, it did not exercise an increased constraint on judges.  Indeed, the 
expansion of precedents appeared to have some effect of liberating judges to be more 
ideological.  Doctrine, it appears, may be either constraining or not.  The next step must 
be to study the specific content of doctrine. 
 Legal academics’ view of doctrine has evolved.  For many, doctrine represents the 
legal rules faithfully applied by judges.  However, there has grown a recognition that the 
law is not applied with perfect neutrality, but its application is influenced by external 
concerns, such as judicial ideology.  Rubin and Feeley have explored the creation of new 
doctrine, which they argue is a product of both judicial ideology and the preexisting legal 
principles on which the judges must build.23  The legal view increasingly recognizes that 
the law is not everything but insists that it is still something important. 
 
II. Social Scientific Views of Doctrine 
 
In stark contrast to legal research, many social scientists have disregarded the 
significance of doctrine entirely.24  This disregard is borne of a presumption that the law, 
as understood by legal academics, doesn’t really matter to judges.  The quantitative social 
scientific research has been carried out by political scientists who have generally 
embraced an a priori position that judges are fundamentally ideological in their approach 
to making decisions.  In addition, social scientists insist that theories be falsifiable, which 
causes a devaluation of the historic path of legal research.  The best test for falsifiable 
theories is statistical empirical analysis, which is commonly used among social scientific 
studies of judicial behavior. 
 Quantitative analysis, which provides scientific rigor to studies of the law, 
requires the reduction of law to numbers of some sort.  The most readily available 
numeric reduction involved case outcomes.  The outcomes of cases could easily be coded 
on a binary scale (as conservative or liberal, affirmance or reversal, etc.), and outcomes 
analysis became the default tool for quantitative social scientific studies of judicial 
decision making.  Moreover, as the outcomes analyses proceeded, social scientists 
obtained a reasoned basis for ignoring the content of opinions. 
 Political scientists who conducted studies of judicial outcomes found that they 
had a statistically significant association with the apparent ideologies of the deciding 
judges (sometimes called the “attitudinal model”). In 1993, Jeff Segal and Harold Spaeth 
set out the case for this approach in the now famous The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model,25 since updated.26  The book identified ideological positions for the 
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justices of the Supreme Court and demonstrated that those ideologies frequently 
correlated with the votes cast by those justices.  Scores of additional studies have 
confirmed this association.  A meta-analysis of the available comparable research to date 
found that ideology was a statistically significant determinant of decisions for every level 
of courts, though the power of the ideological effect varied by type of case and quite 
dramatically by type of court (e.g., the effect is much more powerful in the U.S. Supreme 
Court than in lower federal courts).27
 While these studies have consistently shown some role for judicial ideology, they 
have measured only decisional outcomes, as in which party prevailed in the case and 
whether it took a conservative or liberal position.  The case outcome is obviously 
important for the immediate parties to the action but carries no particular significance for 
others.  The language of the opinion at least purports to establish the rules to govern 
future cases, but political science researchers have generally disregarded the significance 
of this language.  The general outlook was captured in a very early statement by Harold 
Spaeth, who said:  “I find the key to judicial behavior in what justices do, Professor 
Mendelson in what they say.  I focus upon their votes, he upon their opinions.”28
 While one cannot dispute the practical significance of outcomes, a decision to 
ignore opinions misses the law.  Consider the Supreme Court’s ruling on abortion rights 
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,29 in which the Court 
declined to overrule its holding in Roe v. Wade, but modified its trimester analysis in 
favor of an “undue burden” approach for analyzing the constitutionality of state 
restrictions on abortion.  The Court’s decision in Casey was grounded substantially in the 
importance of adhering to precedent.  The opinion in Casey substantially modified the 
rule set forth in Roe and generally reduced constitutional rights to an abortion.  Because 
Casey upheld certain Pennsylvania limitations on abortions, it would be coded as having 
a conservative outcome by political scientists doing quantitative analysis of decisions.  
This coding is accurate inasmuch as the decision represented a shift from Roe in a 
conservative direction.  However, a decision overruling Roe would have been vastly more 
significant, yet would have received the identical coding.  The outcome of Casey was 
certainly important, but doctrine it created for future application was far more significant.  
As Chief Justice Vinson observed:  “What the Court is interested in is the actual practical 
effect of the disputed decision – its consequences for other litigants and in other 
situations.”30  Merely coding for the outcome misses most of the importance of the 
judicial decision. 
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Once they concluded that case outcomes were indeed determined by judicial 
ideology, political scientists could easily jump to the conclusion that the content of legal 
opinions in fact did not matter.  Judges of different ideologies would produce different 
decisions, even when operating from the same legal doctrine.  With this finding, political 
scientists could dismiss doctrine as nothing more than a beard hiding the true basis for 
judicial decisions.  They argued that doctrine was substantively meaningless, because it 
did not determine any future decisions.  Their research became a disciplined case for the 
claims of traditional legal realism. 
 The quantitative evidence about ideology and judicial decision making was far 
too weak, however, to support this conclusion.  While the studies often demonstrated a 
statistically significant correlation between judicial ideology and judicial decisions, 
ideology did not predict the vast majority of decisions.  In fact, the effect at judicial levels 
below the Supreme Court is quite modest.31  Not only was the effect of ideology limited, 
the studies very rarely contained any doctrinal variable to control for the independent 
effects of the law on ideology.  Finally, the political science research focused 
overwhelmingly on Supreme Court decisions, which are unrepresentative, involving only 
a tiny fraction of the functioning law, and often on an even smaller subset of Supreme 
Court cases involving controversial issues of civil liberties.32
  
 As the social scientific study of law has progressed, it has begun to acknowledge 
that the content of judicial opinions, legal doctrine, is worthy of examination.  The 
earliest prominent study came from attitudinalists, seeking to show that doctrine did not 
in fact influence subsequent judicial decisions.  Segal and Spaeth recently undertook a 
study of the Supreme Court’s use of precedent.  They started with a number of landmark 
Supreme Court decisions that contained dissenting opinions and then identified the 
“progeny” of those cases.33  They then examined the behavior of the justices who 
dissented from the original ruling and found that those justices consistently continued 
their initial dissenting position on the legal question, regardless of the precedent set by 
the original opinion.34  The study is important for its empirical exploration of doctrine, 
but its findings have been disputed,35 and it addressed only the Supreme Court’s 
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application of its own horizontal precedent in the most controversial of cases.36  The true 
power of Supreme Court doctrine lies in its ability to influence the vast mass of cases 
decided at lower levels of the judiciary. 
 In contrast to the Segal and Spaeth findings, Mark Richards and Bert Kritzer 
found that certain Supreme Court decisions established new “jurisprudential regimes” 
that dictated the structure of subsequent decisions.37  The decisions had influence by 
“establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the 
level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing case factors.”38  This 
approach came close to a true study of doctrine and found some effect even at the 
Supreme Court level.  The research did not address the questions of why the justices 
crafted specific language or exactly how different language mattered, but it established 
the very important point that doctrine does matter in future decisions. 
 As noted above, the primary power of doctrine lies in its ability to influence 
decisions by lower courts.  A number of political scientists have studied this particular 
question and found that Supreme Court doctrine does appear to drive subsequent lower 
court opinions.  Lower court apparently faithfully followed Supreme Court decisions on 
issues such as defamation and the first amendment,39 obscenity,40 and search and seizure 
law.41  These findings are salient in their showing that the Supreme Court’s precedents do 
in fact influence lower courts, but they shed little light on the intriguing details of why 
particular doctrines are adopted and how different formulations of doctrine may have 
different effects. 
 An important book by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight acknowledged that doctrine 
did matter to Supreme Court justices and discussed how they might strategically use 
precedents.42  Like other political scientists, they assume that justices’ goals are entirely 
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ideological.  However, they argue that adherence to doctrine is necessary to legitimize 
judicial authority, so justices consequently do attend to doctrine.  Thus, the justices will 
“strategically modify their position” to take account of precedent and try to reach a 
decision as close as possible to their preferred ideology, within the constraints of legal 
requirements.43  While the books’ theory of judicial decision making is somewhat 
limited, it does suggest that the content of doctrine is important to the path of the law and 
that decisions are not utterly ideological. 
 A book by Thomas Hansford and James Spriggs takes a broader approach to the 
study of Supreme Court doctrine.44  Their study tries to identify when doctrine is 
affirmed and when it is limited and the degree to which that decision is affected by 
justices’ ideologies or by the strength of the precedent being interpreted.  This research is 
an important breakthrough in the quantitative analysis of doctrine, but it suffers from 
some of the limitations common to past political science research.  It is Supreme Court-
centric, focuses on ideology, and ignores the actual content of opinions.  Nevertheless, it 
produces some significant findings, such as the discovery that ideological justices will go 
after the strongest, best accepted, existing but ideologically contrary precedents and try to 
limit their application in subsequent opinions.  And the book is but the beginning of 
empirical research into doctrine and its meaning. 
 Social scientists have indirectly theorized about doctrine in connection with their 
analyses of the judicial hierarchy.  They have theorized about how higher courts use the 
prospect of reversal to discipline lower courts to adhere to the preferences of the higher 
courts.  Doctrinal language is one way of signaling those preferences to lower courts.  
McNollgast have propounded an interesting theory of how the Supreme Court may 
enhance lower court compliance through use of a “doctrinal interval” and random 
sampling that allows modest departures from its preferences.45  The authors did not 
attempt to empirically test the theories, though, and Cross has argued that the prospect of 
reversal cannot support a general theory of judicial decision making.46
  
 Social scientific research seems to be evolving in the direction of increased 
recognition of the independent significance of legal doctrine.47  While the political 
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46  See Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, supra note 000 (discussing the very low probability 
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scientists remain focused on ideology as the driving force behind judicial outcomes, they 
increasingly acknowledge that the opinions are not irrelevancies.  Their research is 
making important strides enabling the quantitative capture of legal doctrine, to more 
rigorously test for its meaning.  As the research has developed, it appears that law 
professors and social scientists are slowly moving together in their understanding of the 
law’s operation. 
 As evident from the above references and those of the first section, the value of 
the scientific study of legal doctrine is increasingly recognized.  Moreover, there is ample 
empirical support for a general claim that doctrinal choices in fact matter in judicial 
decision making.  To date, this emerging research has proceeded in a rather haphazard 
fashion, though, without much of a coordinating theoretical framework.  Much of the 
research is undertheorized, and the predominant theoretical construct for analyzing the 
choice of doctrine has been avoidance of reversal.  While this approach is theoretically 
sound, the prospect of reversal is sufficiently low that the theory can explain only a 
fragment of the doctrinal choices made by courts.  The following section presents some 
theoretical considerations to guide future research.   
 
III. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations for Analyzing the Role of 
Legal Doctrine 
 
Neither the straightforward legal nor political approaches capture the concept of doctrine 
and its importance in the working of the law.  It should be clear from the research that the 
law is both legal and political.  Political researchers have too often focused on outcomes 
and ignored doctrine.  Legal researchers have studied doctrine as pure legal reasoning, 
without recognizing its political component.  It is this intersection of law and politics that 
demands further study.  The remainder of this article sets out factors that are important to 
this study.  
 
A. Decision Structures: Instruments and Doctrines 
 
Understanding the role of legal doctrine first requires identification of the basic decision 
structures involved in judicial decision making and appearing in judicial opinions.  These 
structures include substantive decision instruments (such as statutory interpretation, 
constitutional review, or reasoning process review), procedural decision instruments 
(such as standing, ripeness, or statute of limitations review), and legal doctrines that 
attach to these decision instruments as guidance in how to apply the instruments in the 
given case (the particular doctrinal language).  There are often multiple decision 
instruments that come into play in a given case.  It is typical, for example, in a court’s 
review of an administrative agency case to consider both statutory interpretation and 
procedural/process instruments.48  There also may be multiple, and sometimes 
competing, doctrines for a given instrument (such as the plain meaning rule and the 
Chevron doctrine49 for statutory interpretation).  The court is left with a set of instrument-
doctrine matches from which to choose in making a decision.  Understanding these 
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49  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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instrument-doctrine options as part of the broader decision making structure of a case is 
critical to understanding the work of judges and the strategic opportunities or limitations 
they face.   
 As an example, consider a policy oriented judge who wishes to defeat a plaintiff’s 
statutory cause of action.  The court can effectively terminate the cause of action by 
finding for the defendant either on a procedural issue (e.g., the plaintiff lacks standing to 
bring the suit) or on the merits (e.g., the plaintiff’s interpretation of the statute is wrong).  
To terminate the case, the judge need only find for the defendant on one of these decision 
instruments.  The choice about which to use to achieve this outcome, or perhaps to use 
both, would be modulated by the available doctrines that attach to each of the 
instruments.  Suppose that the prevailing doctrine for statutory interpretation in that 
jurisdiction was the plain meaning doctrine, and suppose that plain meaning actually 
worked in favor of the plaintiff’s interpretation rather than the defendant’s interpretation.  
Also suppose that there are competing doctrines (one working for the plaintiff, one 
working for the defendant) available on the standing issue such that the court could apply 
either doctrine and appear to have engaged in principled decision making.  The 
sophisticated court would apply the pro-defendant doctrine on the standing issue rather 
than defying the doctrinal guidance on the statutory interpretation issue and risk higher 
court reversal or loss of public legitimacy.    
 Sometimes, doctrine will compel a court to reach an outcome other than the one it 
desires.  At other times, the prevailing legal doctrine may compel a court to choose a 
particular instrument in order to reach the outcome it desires, because other instruments 
yield the contrary outcome.  On yet other occasions, the court might have a choice of 
reaching its desired outcome through more than one doctrinal instrument.  Thus, while 
doctrine can constrain future courts, it can also liberate them to reach desired outcomes.  
The issue is complicated further by the fact that the court’s decision itself may create 
some sort of doctrine, and it has an incentive to choose the instrument and language that 
will be most powerful in influencing future courts.  The impact of its decision feeds into 
the calculus of the judicial doctrinal choice. 
 To be sure, there are sub-instruments and sub-doctrines and the boundaries 
between them can easily melt away when one deconstructs the nature and role each 
structure plays in a given case.  And some instruments can even be created by doctrines.50  
Indeed the creation of doctrinal instruments is an important topic to study.  When courts 
create new doctrinal instruments, they are to some degree providing greater discretion to 
future courts, by providing additional instrumental options for ideologically preferred 
instruments.  They might be expected to take such action when the court system is 
ideologically aligned with the court creating the doctrinal instrument.  An even better 
strategy, though, would be to mold the doctrinal instrument in a manner that has a 
systematic tendency to favor the preferred side.51  Designing such instruments is not easy 
but would be optimal for a court seeking to project its ideology.52
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  Moreover, the fact patterns that must exist to make various decision instruments 
available to judges and the role of the plaintiff’s argumentation in presenting the issues 
are important factors to consider and pose challenges to any analysis or measurement of 
doctrinal use.  Nonetheless, attempts to isolate the structures, understand their 
interdependence, and measure empirically their impact on decision making, is critical to 
the enterprise of understanding legal doctrine and its role in judicial decision making.   
  
B. Models of the Judicial Mind 
 
 Another key to understanding the role of legal doctrine is the adoption of a better 
model of the judicial mind than has currently been offered.  How judges internalize or 
utilize legal doctrine in their mental operations is one of the least understood aspects of 
judicial decision making, but may be key to understanding the relationship of legal 
preferences and policy attitudes.  Proponents of the legal and the attitudinal models have 
so far offered up black boxes, telling us little more than that judges have preferences 
(either for obeying precedent or for certain policies).  A more micro-analytic model of the 
judicial mind that considers psychological, sociological, and economic aspects is needed.  
It may be, for example, that internalization of legal model preferences come from the 
socialization of judges through law school training, clerkships, law practice, and 
fellowship with other judges.  Operating in that mode ensures social-professional 
acceptance by, and credibility within, the judge’s community of peers.  One would also 
ask whether de-socialization occurs at some point, perhaps as judges reach higher levels 
within the judicial hierarchy and view themselves more as policy makers than 
adjudicators of a specific case. 
From an economics of psychology perspective, a judge’s preference for legal 
model analysis may be induced by decision cost efficiencies resulting from the decision 
heuristics that legal doctrine presents.  In such case, doctrines are mentally economical, 
allowing for quicker resolution of cases because judges need not rethink the logical 
underpinnings of fairness and equity for the given factual situation.  Or yet, legal 
doctrines may mirror deeper psychological aspects, such as religious or other value 
systems already inculcated upon a judge’s mind and, thus, allow a judge to actualize 
these psychological preferences in decision contexts that seem tailor made for such use.    
 A more micro-analytic model of the judicial mind could yield great finds in 
analyzing legal doctrine.  For example, if the adoption of legal doctrine as a decision 
mechanism is related to decision cost efficiencies for the judge, then one might postulate 
that higher courts in setting doctrines for lower court obedience (and perhaps political 
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control by the higher court) may design doctrines that improve decision cost efficiency as 
a way to induce obedience by lower courts.  This may mean bright line rules over 
standards in certain instances.  If courts wish to discourage lower court activism, a 
doctrine could be created that, although appearing externally legitimate and principled, in 
application is complex and time consuming, thereby discouraging lower court initiative 
on the issue.  When judges are confronted with alternative high and low cost instruments, 
they may choose the lower cost instrument, even if it yields an ideologically contrary 
result, because of the time pressures that those judges face.53  This may even create a 
natural incentive of the system toward greater reliance on simple rules.  If a judge 
chooses the “plain meaning” doctrine rather than delving into legislative history, that 
judge not only saves his or her own time, the resulting decision also creates doctrine  
regarding the proper doctrine for future controversies. 
 
C. Judicial Hierarchies and Political Linguistics 
 
 Legal doctrine exists within a decision making hierarchy, where outcomes by 
lower courts are subject to review by higher courts.  For a lower court, legal doctrine is 
utilized to resolve the particular case in front of that court.  The institutional role of a 
lower court is to look for guidance coming from precedents and statements of doctrine by 
the higher court.  In reviewing a case on appeal, the higher court’s role is to consider 
more broadly the future effects of its decision and doctrinal pronouncements as they carry 
direct and indirect implications for the courts beneath it, and indicate a commitment for 
the high court’s own future behavior.  Even if the doctrine choice produces for the high 
court an undesirable outcome in the instant case, it may provide greater policy utility over 
the broader set of cases yet to come to the lower courts.  In sum, doctrine plays differing 
roles for the lower and higher courts and should be modeled as such.54  If the higher court 
is more concerned about the implications for many outcomes over a variety of issue 
areas, then measuring the particular case outcome of the higher court (that is, coding who 
wins or loses the particular case), may not capture the work of the court.  The legal 
outcome – that is, the choice or endorsement of a particular doctrine -- may, in fact, be 
more critical, as the effects of the doctrinal statement for future cases to come will 
produce continuing policy impact. 
Recognizing the role of hierarchy is also important because it invites an 
examination of the political-ideological makeup of each level within the hierarchy, 
whether there is political-ideological alignment between the lower and higher levels, and 
how legal doctrine reflects these alignments or nonalignments.  The design of legal 
doctrine (the words, syntax, and structure of the written opinions) may have serious 
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implications for the ability of higher courts to control the behavior of lower courts.55  
When there is less alignment between the lower and higher courts, doctrinal statements 
may be more determinate (looking like rules rather than standards), leaving little 
discretion for the lower courts; when there is more alignment, then doctrinal statements 
from the higher levels may be less determinate, looking more like standards or balancing 
tests that give the lower courts vast discretion.  An aligned court system also should mean 
providing lower court judges with an expanding set of doctrinal instruments to use, in 
their discretion. 
 
D. Political Saliency 
 
 The role of doctrine may also vary by the political saliency of the issue area.  
Routine issues that lack political saliency would more likely be resolved by a judge’s 
strict adherence to legal doctrine.  The majority of cases before the courts most likely fit 
this profile.  Political-ideological preferences would not play the same role as they would 
in cases where the issues are high on the political agendas of legislators and the President, 
and thus the political agendas of the courts (e.g., war powers, abortion, civil rights, and 
federalism issues).  The judges’ psychological interests in applying the law 
conventionally would exceed their ideological interests in the case outcome, where 
saliency is low.  Where political saliency is high, the power of legal doctrine as a guide 
for decision making may weaken, and the threat of high court reversal strengthen, as 
disciplining devices.  Political models of judicial behavior that do no admit to saliency 
concerns may be overbroad as general theory and invite empirical inquiries that fail to 
test the true power of the models. 
 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
This article called for greater attention to the core elements of legal analysis and how 
they relate to a more sophisticated model of judicial behavior.  In short, we ask “what is 
legal doctrine” – in terms of its power as both a legal and political tool for judicial 
decisionmakers.  Such an inquiry will require collaborative efforts between legal scholars 
who understand the legal meaning and implications of doctrine, and social scientists who 
can formalize models of individual and institutional judicial behavior and who also can 
quantify and measure characteristics of legal doctrine in the context of such models.  The 
research dimensions presented here offer some guidance about where to go next.  
Undoubtedly, there are many other aspects of legal doctrine impacting judicial behavior 
that will need to be addressed as the study progresses.  For example, what role does legal 
doctrine play with respect to the willingness of potential litigants to bring cases?  To what 
degree might litigants be able to manipulate doctrinal development through their 
selection of cases to bring before the courts?  To what extent can the legislature control 
legal doctrine with statutory pronouncements?  To what extent can judges affect 
legislative or administrative agency decisions through doctrine on matters like statutory 
interpretation?  Do legal scholars play a role in limiting the use of certain legal doctrines 
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or, perhaps, introducing or endorsing legal doctrines that courts will use?  How do we 
capture the multiple dimensionality of doctrines -- those doctrines that cut across more 
than one issue area, or over multiple instruments, of decision making?  Efforts to address 
these and related questions will bring controversy, but also a greater number of scholars 
with the tools to unpack and evaluate the complex social phenomenon we know as law.  
We are optimistic about the enterprise and the likely normative implications from such 
research.56  
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